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performance of the économie System. This has the clear policy impli-
cation that the most effective method of reducing strike activity is 
through économie policy to reduce fluctuations in the rate of inflation 
rather than through legislated changes in the industrial relations System 
which would deal only with the symptoms and not the causes of récent 
strike activity. 
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS OF A STRIKE: 
A TENTATIVE FRAMEWORK 
S. M. A. Hameed 
Over a period of 16 years (1950-65), approximately 4,500 strikes 
took place in Canada; less than 30 or .7 percent of thèse were regarded 
as emergency disputes.l Government intervention in thèse cases sym-
bolizes concern for protecting public interest and maintenance of an 
equilibrium in the exercise of économie freedom by various groups 
in the society. Government's non-intervention in the remaining 99.3 
percent cases is a reflection of the Canadian public policy concerning 
labour disputes. Free collective bargaining is the corner-stone of labour 
législation and practice in this country, indicating governmental com-
mitment, in a légal and économie sensé, to upholding the right of the 
labour unions to strike. It is logical corollary of a pluralistic market 
system where décisions concerning wages are made through an inde-
pendent collective bargaining relationship between management and 
organized labour : management defending the économie principle of free 
enterprise and labour defending the political principles of «freedom of 
association» and its extension, freedom to strike. 
The strikes in our industrial relations System hâve a positive 
function and appear to be in the public interest.2 The resolution of 
conflict through this mechanism préserves the fundamental démocratie 
* This research was supported by the Canada Department of Labour and the 
Faculty of Business Administration and Commerce at the University of Alberta. I am 
indebted to Tina Lomas and Milt Pahl for their telp in calculating strike cost, using 
input-output tables published by the Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Catalogue No. 15-
501. 
** Hameed, S. M. A., Professor, Faculty of Business Administration and Com-
merce, University of Alberta, Edmonton. 
1
 Alan PUTTEE, «The Impact of Strikes and Emergency Disputes,» Masters 
Thesis, McGill University, 1969. 
2
 See Thomas KENNEDY, «Freedom to Strike is in the Public Interest,» 
Harvard Business Review, July-August, 1970. 
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values of freedom and liberty.3 Accepting thèse basic values and their 
sanctity, however, does not imply that the government should not pro-
tect the public when strikes prolong and create excessive hardships. 
Undoubtedly, the government must intervene cautiously, and only when 
it is clearty warranted. The chief objective of this paper is to analyze 
the various quantitative and not so quantitative costs and benefits, 
associated with strike which may be used as a criterion in the govern-
ment intervention policy. 
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
N. W. Chamberlain and J. M. Schilling did a pioneering study 
which measured the impact of strikes in three key industries, namely, 
coal, railroad and steel.4 However, they did not use a theoretical frame-
work for explaining the behavior of cost and benefit curves, associated 
with a strike in progress. Neither did they indicate the range within 
which government intervention becomes feasible. 
A récent theory of strike cost and government intervention policy 
suggested that the following psycho-economic variables may be ob-
served from the beginning of a strike to détermine the phase during 
which costs exceed benefis. Logically, the higher the costs in relation 
to benefits, the greater the urgency with which the government must 
intervene.5 
Value of Total Production Lost (VTPL) 
As a strike progresses, each man-day lost represents additional 
Resource Units Unemployed (RUU)6 and corresponding loss in pro-
duction. Thus VTPL curve is an upward sloping function, increasing 
with additional RUU. It rises slowly up to point i as the loss to the 
economy is likely to be reduced by the extent of inventory liquidation 
(see Chart I). Beyond that point, VTPL accélérâtes till it hits a plateau 
as s when the effect of substitutes and the phenomenon of offset factor 
begin to operate.7 
3
 John R. COMMUNS, Légal Foundations of Capitalism, Madison: University 
of Wisconsin Press, 1957. 
4
 Neil W. CHAMBERLAIN and Jane SCHILLING, The Impact of Strikes: 
Their Social and Economie Costs, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1954. 
5
 S. M. A. HAMEED, «A Theory of Strike Cost and Government Intervention 
Policy,» Indian Journal of Industrial Relations, Vol. 7, No. 2, October, 1971. Following 
helpful suggestions from a référée of Industrial Relations Quarterly Review, I hâve 
modified the shapes of DNB, VNSB and EIB curves. 
6
 In an extended sensé, RUU represent no only the lost man-hours in the 
struck industry but also laid off workers in other affected industries. 
7
 Given sufficient time interval, there exists a possibility, especially in multi-
plant companies to shift production from the struck plant to another (if it happens to oper-
ate at less than capacity) to compensate for output losses. See C. L. Christensen, «The 
Theory of the Offset Factor: The Impact of Labour Disputes Upon Coat Production.» 
AER XLIII (September, 1953). 
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Discounted Net Benefit (DNB) 
To the extent that unions are a part of the society, benefits ac-
cruing to this group are benefits to the total society. Thus part of the 
production loss sustained by the economy is made good by DNB TO THE 
UNION MEMBERS. It is equal to the negotiated wage increase over the 
contract period plus strike pay less continuing loss of pay during the 
strike.8 The first two factors constitute benefits to the striking em-
ployées whereas the third factor is a growing loss for each day of the 
strike. If the loss is discounted from the constant value of the benefits 
the resulting shape of the Discounted Net Benefit curve with be a né-
gative slope. 
CHART I 
Government 
Intervention 
Cost or 
Benefits 
VTPL 
EIB 
VNSB 
DNB 
Resource Unit Unemployed Over a Period of Time 
Emotional and Institutional Benefits (EIB) 
The indu striai disputes, which are recognized and allowed to take 
place within a légal framework are bénéficiai in a behavioral and institu-
tional sensé as they ensure release of émotions necessary for the con-
tinuation of a System of free collective bargaining. They prove cathartic 
8
 Since the negotiated wage increase will not be known till an actual settlement 
is reached, the Conciliation Board award on the wage rate may be used as a bench mark 
for calculating DNB. This introduces a normative élément in the intervention process, 
akin to a wage-prine guideline. 
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and help in « clearing the air. » The parties can then approach the bar-
gaining table for a more meaningful and acceptable seulement. This 
benefit is présent in every strike in a society where free collective bar-
gaining exists and continues at a certain level throughout the duration of 
strike. EIB curve is therefore a horizontal function. 
Value ofNet Social Benefit (VNSB) 
The value of net social benefit curve is a synthesis of two benefit 
curves (DNB and EPB) and one cost curve, namely, loss of économie 
freedom to producers and consumers (LEF) which is equal to VTPL. 
GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION 
The behavior of VTPL, DNB, EIB and VNSB (see Chart 1) 
changes as more and more resource units become unemployed, cor-
respondis to each additional day of the strike. The pattern of change 
seems to fall in two discernible phases. In Phase I (till u resource units 
become unemployed) the benefits (DNB and EIB) are higher than the 
costs (VTPL) which clearly indicates that the government must not 
intervene. Hère the cost of maintaining the institution of free collective 
bargaining is minimal. The intersection of BTPL and VNSB marks the 
end of Phase I (at u) when the government may intervene in order to 
avoid the prolongation of a costly strike in Phase II. The unemployment 
of resources beyond u is costly because the loss of économie freedom 
of the consumers and producers (VTPL being equal to LEF) is far in 
excess of the emotional benefits of the strike. 
A N EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
An attempt is made in this section to operationalize the variables 
outlined above and to empirically test the theory, by using the case of 
Algoma Steel strike of 1966/1967. Each of the variables used in the 
theory will be discussed seperately to explain the method of its quantifi-
cation. 
VALUE OF TOTAL PRODUCTION LOST (VTPL) 
A Leontieff or input-output technique9 is used for calculating 
VTPL in the Algoma Steel strike. The System is useful for measuring 
the day-to-day losses in production, not only in the struck company but 
in the entire economy. For example, the forward and backward linkages 
of the steel industry in this case, reveal the degree of its interdependence 
among the industries of Canada. The coefficient of forward linkage of 
the steel industry indicates the proportion of its output which becomes 
9
 An input-output table is a square matrix, cornprised of three sectors: (1) the 
processing sector, (2) the final demand sector, and (3) the payments sector. The input-
output system can be represented by the équation: (1 - A) X = C where X is the gross 
output vector; A is a matrix of input coefficients aij, where ay is the amount of iriput 
from industry i required per unit output for industry j ; and C is the vector of final demand. 
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the input into another industry ; for example, it may be observed from 
Table 110 that iron and steel has a high forward linkage (.987864) which 
means that a strike in this industry will hâve a much greater impact on 
the producing sector than a strike in another industry such as tobacco 
which has a low forward linkage (.000027). 
The Algoma Steel strike originally involved eighty bridklayers of 
the Bricklayers', Masons' and Plasterers' International Union. It lasted 
for 26 days. 
The Algoma Seel strike originally involved eighty bricklayers of 
the Bricklayers', Masons' and Ptasterers' International Union. It lasted 
for 26 days. For the purpose of measuring VTPL, man-hours lost figures 
for the directly affected employées11 were multiplied by output per 
man-hour estimâtes in the steel industry. In order to introduce time 
élément in the calculation, seven equi-distance stages of RUU (Resource 
Units Unemployed) were introduced (see column 1, Table 2) and cor-
respondis production cost figures were obtained (column 3). Each of 
thèse seven figures was then appïied to the impact table12 for assessing 
loss of production in other industries. Table 1 is an example of this 
calculation which indicates that a loss of $122,434.25 production in 
Algoma Steel resulted in the total losses of $239,655.89 throughout the 
Canadian economy. The process was repeated for ail the seven phases 
of the strike (see column 4, Table 2). 
DISCOUNTED NET BENEFIT (DNB) 
In operationalizing the concept of Discounted Net Benefit some 
compromises had to be made because of the non-availability of data on 
strike pay. However, there was no difficulty in calculating monetary 
benefit per worker over a three year contract which gave 72 c per hour. 
Wages lost during the seven arbitrarily selected phases of the strike were 
calculated at the rate of $3.28 per hour which was the average rate at the 
time. Thèse estimâtes are shown in columns 5, 6, 7 and 8 of Table 2. 
10
 The data are obtained from Table 8 of the Dominion Bureau of Statistics 
publication, The Input-Output Structure of the Canadian Economy, 1961, Catalogue 
No. 15-501. 
It is possible to use this publication for calculating production losses for Algoma 
Steel strike of 1966-67 by assuming that no major structural changes hâve occurred 
between 1961 and 1967. This is not an unreasonable assumption since, in gênerai, struc-
tural changes take place very slowly, and any changes which may hâve occurred will 
be slight due to the relatively short period involved. 
11
 The calculation could be based on three différent reported figures, namely, 
striking employées, directly affected, and indirectly affected. The figures used hère are 
those of the middle category (i.e. 545). 
12
 The matrix ( 1 - A ) - 1 is called an impact table. This table can be used to find 
the changes in gross output caused by a change in final demand. To apply an impact table 
to discover the loss of product caused by a strike, it is first necessary to find out what 
amount of change in final demand would hâve caused this fall and then apply this « artificial 
final demand » to the impact table. 
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TABLE 1 
Indust. Name of Product 
No. ndustry Coefficient Lost 
1. Agriculture 005987 742.07 
2. Forestry 002934 363.63 
3. Fishing, Hunting .000324 40.16 
4. Métal Mines 126115 15,630.20 
5. Non-Metal Mines 006024 746.60 
6. Coal Mines .020040 2,483.70 
7. Petroleum, Natural Gas .009727 1,205.49 
8. Méat, Poultry .001809 224.18 
9. Dairy Factories .001373 170.18 
10. Fruit, Vegetable Can. .000466 57.79 
11. Feed, Flour, Cereal .001024 126.96 
12. Biscuit, Bakeries .000664 82.28 
13. Sugar, Confectionary .000283 35.02 
14. Other Food .002150 266.42 
15. Soft Drinks .000332 41.14 
16. Alcoholic Beverages .000453 56.20 
17. Tobacco Industries .000027 3.31 
18. Rubber Production .004616 572.14 
19. Leather Production .000203 25.10 
20. Synthetic Textiles .000582 72.11 
21. Coton, Yarn .000722 89.50 
22. Knitting Mills , .000053 6.61 
23. Clothing Industries .000442 54.73 
24. Other Textiles .001279 158.55 
25. Sawmills .001542 191.12 
26. Furniture Fixtures .000419 51.91 
27. Other Wood .003070 380.53 
28. Pulp and Paper .005403 669.60 
29. Other Paper .004235 524.88 
30. Printing, Publishing .007041 872.59 
31. Iron and Steel .987864 122,434.25 
32. Smelting Refineries .109294 28,498.52 
33. Other Primary Metals .016379 2,029.96 
34. Structural Métal .010092 1,250.79 
35. Métal Stamp .006488 804.15 
36. Other Métal Mfg. .048080 5,971.85 
37. Machinery .012937 1,603.40 
38. Aircraft and Parts .000791 98.07 
39. Motor Vehicle .001130 140.06 
40. Vehicle Parts .004234 524.75 
41. Other Trans. Equipment .002023 250.75 
42. Electrical Appliance .000696 86.32 
43. Elect. lnd. Equipment .001716 212.67 
44. Com. Equip. and Wire .008313 1,030.28 
45. Other Elect. Products .004931 611.04 
46. Clay, Lime, Cernent .020370 2,524.72 
47. Non Métal Mining .003210 397.79 
48. Pet. Prod. Industries .019905 2,467.05 
49. Plastic, Synthetics .001051 130.27 
50. Paint and Varnish .003183 394.48 
51. Pharmacy, Soap .002810 348.33 
52. Other Chemicals .018518 2,295.15 
53. Mise. Manufacturing .004699 582.42 
54. Construction .016105 1,996.05 
55. Trade, Wh. Retail .064303 7,969.74 
56. Transport, Storage .056507 7,005.93 
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57. Communications .009684 1,200.22 
58. Utilities .044323 1,006.58 
59. Fin, Ins, RI. Estate .020093 2,490.31 
60. Business Services .006783 840.63 
61. Hôtel, Rest. .005301 656.98 
62. Other Services .014633 1,813.62 
63. Office Supplies .004427 178.75 
64. Adv. and Travel .016056 1,989.92 
65. Operating Supplies .095815 11,875.39 
Total (Row 1-65) 239,655.89 
EMOTIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL BENEFITS (EIB) 
The concept of EIB, as outlined and presented graphically in the 
previous section, is elusive and hard to quantify. As techniques of 
quantification in behavioral sciences improve, one might expect to 
measure the degree of catharsis obtained by the workers in the early 
phases of strike. This may mean a saving of many more man-hours 
which could be lost either through additional strikes or other covert 
expressions of conflict such as slowdown, absenteeism or petty griev-
ances. In the absence of empirical results of a research which could 
relate emotional employée catharsis with man-hours saved, one may 
simply ask: what measureable benefits does the Canadian society hâve 
in not banning the strikes ? 
There are innumerable environmental variables which govern the 
structure and working of an industrial relations System. It has, among 
other factors, prevented scholars from propounding a comparative 
theory of industrial relations. Nonetheless, efforts hâve been made to 
explain why, for example, Canadian and Australian Systems differ. 
The most glaring différence is the freedom of strike in Canada and 
compulsory arbitration in Australia. If in a partial analysis, we were 
to treat this différence as a causal factor, other features being braodly 
similar, we may conclude that greater incidence of strikes in Australia 
is due to compulsory arbitration. Thus it may be argued that the threat 
of a strike reduces the possibility of its actual occurrence, producing 
an Emotional and Institutional Benefit of a System of free collective 
bargaining. Canada has this benefit and it accrues to the whole society. 
Symbolically and materially it is présent in each strike that takes place 
in the Canadian economy. Can we measure this benefit if it existed in the 
Algoma Steel strike ? 
In some years Australia had fifteen times as many strikes as those 
in Canada. In 1966 the discrepancy was not as great, although Australia 
had 656 strikes in excess of those in Canada which resulted in a loss of 
386,632.2 man-days. It may be stipulated that by not having compulsory 
arbitration Canada saved thèse man-days which would hâve cost 
$2,822,415.06 in that year (column 9, Table 2). This is the value of EIB 
in Algoma Steel and other strikes taking place in 1966. 
TABLE 2 
Costs and Benefis of Algoma Steel Strike 
Manhours Discounted 
Lost For Net Benefi DNB 
RUU 545 Production VTPL Total Per For 545 VNSB 
Resource Units Employées Lost Results Benefi Over Cost in Employée Employées VSB Col. 10-
Unemployed (Col. 1 x Col. 2 x From the Contract Wages (Col. 5- (Col. 7 x Col. 8 & Col.4 
(Per Employée) 545) 8.986 Impact Table Life Lost Col. 6) 545) EIB Col. 9 (VSB-LEF)* 
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 8 9 10 11 
25 (4.34 days) 13,625 122,434.25 239,656.89 499.20 82.00 417.20 227,374.00 2,822,415.06 3,049,789.06 2,810,132.17 
50 (8.75 days) 27,250 244,868.50 457,338.45 499,20 164.00 335.20 182,984.00 2,822,415.06 3,005,099.06 2,547,760.61 
75 (13.09 days) 40,875 367,302.75 683,401.12 499.20 246.00 253.20 137,994.00 2,822,415.06 2,960,409.06 2,277,007.94 
100 (17.50 days) 54,500 489,737.00 914,104.17 499.20 328.00 171.20 93,304.00 2,822,415.06 2,915,719.06 2,001,614.89 
125(21.91 days) 68.125 612,171.25 1,143,531.51 499.20 410.00 89.20 48,614.00 2,822,415.06 2,871,029.06 1,727,497.55 
148 (25.90 days) 80,660 724,810.76 1,353,723.55 499.20 485.44 13.76 7,499.20 2,822,415.06 2,829,914.26 1,476,190.71 
150 (26.25 days) 81,750 734,605.50 1,372,010.70 499.20 492.00 7.20 3,924.00 2,822,415.06 2,826,339.06 1,454,328.36 
175 (30.45 days) 95,375 857,039.75 1,600.684.53 499.20 584.00 -84.80 -46,216.00 2,822,415.06 2,776,199.06 1,175,514.53 
200 (35.00 days) 109,000 979,474.00 1,829,351.64 499.20 666,00 -156.80 -84,456.00 2,822,415.06 2,737,959.06 908,607.42 
VTPL = Value of Total Product Lost 
EIB = Emotional and Institutional Benefits 
DNB = Discounted Net Benefits 
VSB = Value of Social Benefit 
VNSB = Value of Net Social Benefi 
LEF = Loss of Economie Freedom 
*VTPL = LEF, VSB — LEF = VNSB 
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VALUE OF NET SOCIAL BENEFIT (VNSB) 
The Canadian society has accorded légal récognition to strikes 
and in this paper we hâve argued that this acceptance has two identi-
fiable benefits, namely Discounted Net Benefit (DNB) to the workers 
and Emotional and Institutional Benefits (EIB) for the entire economy. 
A combination of thèse two benefits (i.e. Value of Social Benefit, VSB) 
must always be greater than the Loss of Economie Freedom (LEF) to 
the producers and consumers, if the strike has to remain viable and play 
a positive rôle. 
Conceptually, the Loss of Economie Freedom is différent from the 
loss of production (VTPL) due to strike, but in order to make LEF 
operational, it may be equated with VTPL. In column 11 of Table 2, 
the differential between VNSB and LEF is labelled as the Value of Net 
Social Benefit (VNSB) which is higher than BTPL in the non-inter-
vention phase and lower in the intervention phase of the strike (see 
Chart II). 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Under the existing labour-relations laws in Canada there is no 
provision for shortening the length of a strike, unless it is deemed an 
emergency dispute. The government's intervention in a légal strike is 
considered répugnant to the tenets of free collective bargaining. This 
stand was defensible some three or four décades ago when automation 
had not reduced the effectiveness and utility of strikes.13 But now, the 
public is often subjected to prolonged and purposeless strikes. The law 
safeguards the workers' right to strike but seems reluctant to protect 
the freedom of the public to obtain goods and services after a defined 
period of strike. 
The government has no objective guidelines or criteria to décide 
how long a strike may be permitted to continue without an intervention. 
The theory briefly outlined in this paper has suggested that costs and 
benefits of a strike must be regarded as relevant considérations. The 
quantification of various cost/benefit components has been attempted in 
the case of Algoma Steel strike to détermine the period after which in-
tervention was advisable. In Chart II, the cost curve (VTPL) which in-
cluded production losses in Algoma Steel and in ail other affected in-
dustries has been plotted for a period of 35 days. The benefit curve 
(VNSB) is a downward sloping curve which intersects VTPL, 1.08 days 
after the actual settlement took place. The government's non-interven-
tion in this strike, according to our cost/benefit analysis, is absolutely 
defensible. But it is not known if there would hâve been an intervention, 
had the strike extended into Phase IL In ail probability the government 
may not hâve intervened because it may not hâve constituted an emer-
gency dispute. 
13
 Thomas KENNEDY, op. cit. and S. M. A. HAMEED, «Responsive Bar-
gaining: Freedom to Strike with Responsibility, » Industriel Relations Quarterly Review. 
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CHART II 
Algoma Steel Strike 
Phase I 
(No Government Intervention) 
Phase II 
(Government Intervention) 
VTPL 
(Value of Total 
Production Lost) 
VNSB 
(Value of Net Social 
Benefit) 
25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 RUU 
4.34 8.75 13.09 17.50 21.91 26.25 30.45 35.00 Man-Days 
145 
25.90 
Resource Unit Unemployed Over a Period of Time 
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According to the criteria of our analysis, the Algoma Steel strike 
in Phase II has lower social benefits (VNSB) and higher production 
costs (VTPL). At this point, a question of value judgment becomes per-
tinent: should such a strike be permitted to continue? The decision-
makers may hâve considérations beyond those discussed in this paper, 
which may allow a costly strike to prolong. But if the labour and man-
agement, government and the public know that a given strike has en-
tered a phase where its costs are greater than its benefits, then we hâve 
developed some objective guidelines for an intervention policy. Further-
more, the very awareness that a strike has become costly in relation to 
its benefits, will exert an extraneous pressure on the parties for a speedy 
seulement. 
CONCLUSION 
The theory of strike cost and government intervention policy has 
a number of variables, ail of which can be operationalized. The shape 
of the VTPL and VNSB curves when fitted with the empirical data for 
the Algoma Steel strike correspond with the envisaged shapes in the 
theory. Their intersection simply distinguished the intervention and non-
intervention phases of the strike as envisioned in the theory. It de-
monstrated that a cost/benefit analysis of a strike is feasible in providing 
an objective criterion for government intervention policy. 
The average duration of strikes in Canada has increases since 
World War II. They are also becoming less effective and costlier, 
especially in the public sector. Thus, the government's stance of inter-
vention only in the «emergency» disputes needs re-examination. The 
basis of intervention, mainly to protect the public from undue incon-
venience, should now become «costliness» of the dispute rather than its 
«émergent» nature. Needless to point out that the latter criterion has 
always been vague and largely subjective. 
In an era of technological précision, the methodology of social 
sciences continues to be qualitative, subjective and vague. There are 
very few operational théories in industrial relations, partly because of a 
tendency to reject theorizing and quantification of social variables on the 
grounds that the problems are much too complex to be reduced to 
numbers. But it may be argued that numbers, although a poor reflection 
of social phenomena, tend to crystallize thinking and attitudes. For 
instance if the cost and benefit figures for each day of a strike in progress 
are publicised by the Department of Labour, there would be a change in 
labour management and public response toward the desirability and ex-
pected length for which the strike may continue. This is a process of 
public éducation which may, by itself, preclude the need for government 
intervention. 
